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Abstract 
Emotions dominating normative frameworks is not new in the making of 
migration-related policies or in public discourses on migration. However, 
this matter has entered a different dimension in the age of populism and 
post-factualism reshuffling the parameters of this issue to a large extent.  
I will argue in this article that we can find a mixture of developments that 
consecutively reveals a state of public discourses that is highly precarious 
and that needs change and counteraction. Instead of retreating into well-
trodden policy issues and overtly neglecting the potentiality for a construc-
tive discourse that includes the deliberation on migration realties and migra-
tory processes and its complexities, a vision is needed for new evidence-
based, well-informed, yet not technocratic, forms of discourse and a future of 
reflexive knowledge production.  
Keywords 
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Öffentliche Diskurse und Migrationspolitik:  
Eine prekäre Situation und ein düsterer Ausblick? 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Prägung politischer und öffentlicher Migrationsdiskurse durch Emotio-
nen und Normativität ist nicht neu. Im Zeitalter von Populismus und Post-
Faktizität hat diese Prägung jedoch Dimensionen angenommen, die die 
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Parameter dieses Sachverhalts deutlich verschieben. Ich werde in diesem 
Beitrag verschiedene Entwicklungen diskutieren, die einen öffentlichen Dis-
kurs kenntlich machen, der als hochgradig prekär bezeichnet werden kann 
und der Änderungen sowie Gegenmaßnahmen benötigt. Anstatt bekannte 
und veraltete Politiken zu rekurrieren und einen potenziell konstruktiven 
Diskurs zu vernachlässigen, braucht es Ideen und Visionen einer evidenz-
basierten, jedoch nicht technokratischen, Form eines Migrationsdiskurses 
und einer zukünftigen reflexiven Wissensproduktion.  
Schlagwörter 
Migration, öffentlicher Diskurs, Migrationsdiskurs, Migrationspolitik, Poli-
tikproduktion, Post-Faktizität, Wissensproduktion 
* * * * * 
Introduction 
The field of migration has become a pivotal issue that drives some of the 
most drastic changes in political landscapes and policy-making areas in the 
past decades. The election of Donald Trump as US president, populism on 
the rise in Europe or the UK leaving the European Union have been domi-
nated and fueled by the skewed and often convoluted policy field of migra-
tion, its managerial control components and its discursive undercurrents. 
Consecutively, European governments implicitly admitted the failure of 
their immigration policy as regards the control and management of increas-
ingly ›unwanted migrants‹ during the past decades (Castles 2004; Freeman 
1994; Joppke 1998). The ›lost control‹ claim arose in the beginning of the 
1990s and gathered momentum in the European ›asylum crisis‹ when the fear 
over the unwanted migration of asylum seekers shifted to a fear over the 
asylum-seeking process that portrayed it as a potential pathway for irregular 
migration. Such pathways of ›bogus asylum‹ or ›economic asylum‹ were 
increasingly reflected repeatedly in policy discourses. There is a long list of 
examples, with some European ones to be found in Austria, Slovakia, Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary (Vollmer 2011). At the European as well as 
the national level, the evolution of legislations epitomized a growing concern 
over such ›uncontrolled‹ groups of migrant populations. Governments intro-
duced restrictionist legislation and the development of control logics to over-
see and manage the selection of migrants across borders. Sovereignty logics 
claimed back power, and the alleged ›lost control‹ over national and Europe-
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an borders became increasingly prominent in policy and public discourses 
alike (Sassen 1996; Kraler et al. 2008; Vollmer 2011). 
Some of these rather hidden legislations were paired with the develop-
ment of welfare policies in the EU and beyond. After a neoliberal rollback, 
and an ongoing ›dual crisis‹ of welfare states and national identities in Eu-
rope (Schierup et al. 2006; Jenson 2009), the very foundations of welfare pro-
vision were put in question by policy reforms and their underlying concepts. 
New exclusionary borders have been drawn around social rights and public 
welfare provision, producing a ›hierarchy of citizenship‹ (Castles 2007) that 
conflicts with human rights law and is frequently challenged by it (Blake 
2004). Rising opposition challenged the access to social protection for non-
citizens based on the view that »social protection should be for those who 
belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it«, 
which has been critically labeled as arising ›welfare chauvinism‹ (Kitschelt 
1997, p. 22; see also Mewes and Mau 2012). Attempts to explain such chau-
vinism include »cultural and economic conditions, but also individual per-
ceptions and explanations«, such as perceived material risk (Mewes and Mau 
2012, p. 150). Fear of ›the stranger‹ combined with material risk averse behav-
ior as well as surveys that state a migration potential of 15% of the world’s 
adult population (Esipova et al. 2018) have built a fundament that resonates 
in public domains. 
Once again, the destructive language and arguments that were used in 
the early 1990s can be found in discourses on migration in the more recent 
past (e.g., Rheindorf and Wodak 2018; Fuchs 2016) and the present. This 
language and its related arguments are well perceived in the public domain. 
Immigration opponents use various arguments frequently involving meta-
phors that usually refer to the consequences of immigration being harmful 
for the country, such as swapping or flooding, or being offensive or danger-
ous. Immigration will »destroy Japan«, as Makoto Sakurai of the Japan First 
Party has, for example, stated (Guest 2019). The intention is to produce fear 
and a threat – by now, a well-known phenomenon of the configuration of the 
migration discourse on a global scale.  
Such language and engaged narratives – irrespective of their truth value 
– have been present in public discourses for many years; however, the impact 
of such narratives has increasingly gained political significance. Using fear or 
angst that stems from the unknown and strange object is effectively winning 
votes in the past and in the present day (see Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, Poland, the US, etc.). Nevertheless, we can find a dif-
ferent quality of populism and a widespread political efficiency of these nar-
ratives, which has gained a new relevance and historic momentum. This 
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development affects public discourses and consequently also policy-making 
as such.  
This article intends to discuss the precarious situation, mostly with refer-
ence to the case of Germany by drawing attention to some ramifications that 
call for new research and the balancing of a discourse that considers migrato-
ry processes as much as the processes and implementation of ›migrant inte-
gration‹ (a highly problematic concept as such which will not be discussed in 
detail). First, I will show and discuss the matter of emotionality, which is not 
new to the migration discourse or the politics of it. A short excursion into the 
German legislative history will exemplify this, while a second, and more 
alarming point will link this normative dimension with the arising phenom-
ena of post-factualism, which fuels and exploits this normative dimension in 
drastic and most efficient ways. As a consequence, the German discourse is 
convoluted and polarized at various levels. It is a topic that is becoming po-
litically ›overly convoluted‹ and consequently political actors retreat into the 
more structured and less convoluted topics such as ›migrant integration‹ that 
offer a way to deal with this field, but which drastically oversimplify it and 
ignore important angles – and by which I will draw this third and last part to 
a close.  
Emotionality and Normativity Resonate 
Using an example and looking at German legislative development and its 
production by using methods of discourse and policy analysis (Vollmer 
2014), we can find, for instance, for the period 1973–1999 a range of policy-
making processes that are dominated by emotional and normative frame-
works. In particular, the policy domain of controlling migration and especial-
ly irregular forms of migration is driven by values, beliefs and fears.1 One can 
find a fierce, emotionalized bargaining game among political actors. Instead 
of trying to objectively use data and information, actors seek information that 
they can use for underpinning their belief or value systems. Knowledge and 
facts are used rather as political ammunition, that is, knowledge and facts are 
functionalized for the actors’ normative frameworks. Instead of evidence-
based arguments, the policy domain of migration control operates with nor-
mative categories (e.g., threat, deception, overpopulation paranoia), which 
has an impact on the outcome of a decision-making process.  
–––––––––––– 
1  For a more updated discussion see, for instance, Poutrus (2019) or for a discussion linked 
to migration regimes, see, for instance, Hess and Kasparek (2017). 
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These normative frameworks could be found in several policy processes, 
one of them is, for instance, the AZR (Central Register of Foreign Nationals)2. 
In 1994, two bills were published, one government bill (18 March 1994) and 
another one proposed by the Fraktionen CDU/CSU and FDP (1 March 1994). 
In short, the reintroduction of the AZR was intended to be a preventive 
measure and to enable officers »to refuse entry« if a »justified suspicion is 
identified«. During the policy process, deception and mistrust were norma-
tive elements, which equally imbued the decision-making trajectories. Analy-
sis has shown that dynamic policy frames entailing elements of deceit ex-
tended to criminality, deviousness, or the ›morally contestable‹. Emotive 
arguments, including distrust and suspicion, were reconciled with instru-
mental measures in policy frame constructions (Vollmer 2014). Values linked 
to myth and memories of the nation and culture (see, e.g., Smith 1971; 1988) 
were found as an additional part in decision-making frameworks. However, 
such narratives referring to myths and memories of nationhood had already 
shown their effectiveness in previous legislative processes.  
Reaching further back in German policy history, this became apparent in 
a crucial phase of the policy process of Ausländerpolitik.3 In the final phase of 
Ausländerpolitik, starting at the end of the 1970s and which continued 
throughout the 1980s, political actors (in this case mainly members of the 
Deutscher Bundestag) pointed to the significance of national sentiments re-
minding members of parliament of ›their heritage‹. Parliamentary coalition 
groups used figurative tools to signify alienation, fostering the potential risk 
of further detachment of the German population from their ›own communi-
ty‹.  
Another example is the policy process of the Asylum Law in 1993, which 
changed the German Constitution (§ 16 of the Grundgesetz). Discourse analy-
sis has shown that discursive processes were gradually dominated by a few 
argumentative constructions. One of the major components of these construc-
tions was the element of threat. Policy makers referred to the abuse of the 
German Asylum Law (and therefore indirectly the abuse of the German Con-
stitution) by a group of ›bogus people‹ that had no right to be in Germany.4 
However, this discursive linkage threat was effectively related to notions of 
–––––––––––– 
2  The Ministry of the Interior (BMI) proposed a foreigner database (AZR) in August 1988. It 
was amended several times by the BMI between August 1988 and June 1989 and discussed 
in both parliamentary houses until the process ceased in September 1990. The bill was 
denoted as being unconstitutional and discriminative in its nature. 
3  Not to be confused with ›policies on foreigners‹ in general. However, this is a specific 
policy process.  
4  See also, for instance, meetings of the Interior Standing Committee on 29 April 1992, 
6 May 1992 and 23 September 1992. 
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illegality, criminality and organized crime (see Vollmer 2014; for more recent 
examples, see Poutrus 2019). 
Nevertheless, policy issues and proposed policy solutions, introduced 
and mobilized by actors, need another decisive variable: acceptability, or reso-
nance. This variable built the basis on which policy preferences or policy 
choices (among political actors and ›the public‹) are justified or as Edelman 
(1977; 2001) would put it »symbolically justified«. More generally speaking, 
differences exist between various policy domains (see, e.g., May et al. 2006) 
and each policy domain plays by its own rules. Therefore, not only the nature 
of the political bargaining game, but also the environment of this game needs 
to be looked at in future research. But how can we speak about further ex-
planatory insights of such prevailing emotional frameworks and how can 
political actors exploit emotional frameworks? 
By introducing a psychological perspective on decision-making, scholars 
have shown in the past (e.g., Tetlock 1985) that there are features of political 
contexts and distinctive ways of thinking about policy issues as well as 
decision dilemmas that are related to them. In this way, policy issues become 
distinctively defined a priori and thus influence policy decision processes 
that have implications for policy outcomes (Farnham 1990; Kaarbo 2008). In 
turn, features of political context create a pervasive concern in the view of 
acceptability, which has been demonstrated in the political science literature 
over a period of decades (see, e.g., Harring et al. 2019; Schilling 1961). Politi-
cal context predetermines the acceptability or sufficient consensus for a given 
proposal. It determines to some extent effective political action and its under-
lying policy aims (George 1980; Schmidtke 2014). We can observe that party 
politics and normative framing of policy domains became increasingly 
prominent, especially in the domain of migration control. With regard to this 
specific policy domain of migration, each policy issue is not only a policy 
problem but also a political problem, and henceforth acceptability and public 
resonance play a decisive role (see Anderson 2017; Brown 2010; Castles 2004). 
Acting on the premise of achieving acceptability by taking into account 
majorities and their sentiments in parliaments as well as public opinion, ra-
tional imperatives can be strategically neglected, as irrational frameworks 
offer more flexibility and efficiency – as the case above regarding Germany 
has demonstrated. Parliamentary popularity may not comply with opinions 
that are popular in the historic moment as perceived by members of the pub-
lic. Values, belief systems, emotions and normative frameworks offer strate-
gically more attractive and broader coverage and reach a higher degree of 
acceptability and resonance at both levels (parliament and public opinion). 
Normative frameworks offer more flexibility and thus they are less compli-
cated to adjust, if necessary, in order to create more resonance. Building a 
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consensus among those who have substantial impact on the policy process, 
namely coalition leaders or powerful individuals in parliament (see, e.g., 
Putnam 1988), values and belief systems can be incrementally adjusted dur-
ing policy conflicts. Political actors often desire to serve a number of values, 
thus creating a blending or combination of several normative elements into a 
new one, which is likely to fit into features that are needed for the policy 
proposal to be effectively accepted at both levels: parliament and the public. 
This blending survives a screening for acceptability and can incorporate a 
variable significance of each normative element (for instance threat, decep-
tion, overpopulation paranoia) (see Vollmer 2014). 
Nevertheless, in this way, policy proposals that are expected to reach no 
acceptability will not be put forward and henceforth policy proposals that are 
expected to satisfy the majority will be preferred. Such a preoccupation with 
acceptability, however, leads to policy measures that will be presumably 
accepted but not necessarily to the ones that are urgently needed or that rep-
resent a thoroughly deliberated and possibly sustainable solution.5 
One might even propose the assumption that a sustainable solution 
based on available and up-to-date evidence and data might not be relevant at 
all, but the primary goal is the political acceptability and resonance in public 
domains themselves to win on the battlefield of politics. Hence, policy-
making on migration is under the influence of entire bandwidths of interests, 
institutions, and ideas, which – following their ›own agendas‹ – might not be 
based on the realities of the processes or causes and effects of migration (see 
also, e.g., Hampshire 2013). In addition, personal beliefs and public opinion 
on migration might be strongly shaped by a range of different factors that 
have little or nothing to do with facts, data and evidence (Blinder 2011), and 
coming back to the matter of the above explicated role of acceptability and 
resonance, this very matter has entered a different dimension and that is the 
matter of populism in connection with the age of post-factualism and emo-
tionalism that reshuffles the parameters of this problem to a large extent (see 
also Boswell et al. 2011).  
 
–––––––––––– 
5  We still look at a discursive context in which public debates and policy-making are often 
ill-informed and based on mythical narratives instead of facts (see, e.g., Boswell 2008; 2009). 
Research has produced relevant insights about the field of migration; however, there are 
significant limits to the existing data and analyses. Ruhs et al. (2019) argue that because 
there are considerable gaps in the evidence base and there are mixed results around key 
migration issues such as the impact of immigration and the solidarity among ›natives‹, 
there are also reasons why data and research play a relatively minor role in public debates 
and policy-making on migration. 
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Post-factualism  
To generate threat scenarios in public migration discourses was and is com-
paratively simple, but the digitalized public domain has the power to gener-
ate fear out of thin air. With sufficient speed and the effect of virality, fear 
and unfound paranoia can be generated through peer-to-peer information 
transmission. For instance, Müller and Schwarz (2019) have shown how such 
fear was facilitated by correlating anti-refugee hate crimes in Germany and 
the increasing use of Facebook. Increased use of digital and online media and 
related decision-making processes attune users to more heuristic ways of 
decision-making, giving higher importance to emotions and ›gut-feeling‹ 
(see, e.g., Appel 2020). Post-truth, the post-factual continuum and the related 
revision of decision-making principles and processes have gained substantial 
political force.  
At the same time, the intellectual building blocks of the modern age, 
which comprised concepts and meanings of truth, scientific expertise and 
evidence with the goal of creating progress and innovation in societies, have 
experienced a process of being discredited. Epistemic communities and their 
potential insights and ideas no longer have the capacity of ordering and set-
tling arguments or political conflicts. Experts and policy makers are discred-
ited as an elite group, which are blamed for serving themselves instead of the 
common good or the public (see also Davies 2018).6 Consequently, rather 
than trusting experts, some societal strata rely on services that are digitally 
fast and seemingly believable and which are assumed to have no agenda, or 
›deceitful agenda‹ behind their public status.  
Surely, the theorization and use of emotions and rationality is of highest 
value and has manifold fields of applications (Bechara and Damasio 2005; 
Damasio 2005), but in the context of politics and policy-making (Bloom 2014), 
the dominance of emotionality and dominant heuristic thinking structures, it 
potentially introduces various complications. Since the bargaining game over 
the policies and political agendas underlie certain rules, in the end, political 
actors or coalition groups who want to win this game need to win the majori-
ty, not only in parliament but also among ›the public‹. Brader et al. (2008) 
and more recently Blinder et al. (2013) and Turper et al. (2014) have discussed 
how delicate the relationship is between public opinion and immigration 
politics. Yet it opens a window of opportunity for political or public actors 
using whatever narrative or myth that could potential go viral or reach a 
critical mass of digital multiplicities that serve the interests of such actors. 
One could argue, who cares if this ›news‹ or these ›narratives‹ have a value 
–––––––––––– 
6  Which might change again as a result of the ongoing Coronavirus crisis.  
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of truth or whether they are evidence-based? The aim of such actors is to 
create mobilization and recognition while the means are meaningless.  
Going through the detailed configuration of the post-factual age (see, 
e.g., Kaeser 2016; McIntyre 2018; or Jaster and Lanius 2019) or listing all the 
disinformation that has been fed to the public discourse over past years in 
the field of migration would clearly go beyond the limit of this paper, but the 
meaning of the post-factual concept is relevant here because it points to the 
devaluation of truth (see also König 2016). The evidence of showing that a 
statement is true became irrelevant and the term of alternative facts arose in 
more frequent and prominent fashion (Cooke 2017).7 There is no true or un-
true because facts raised against other facts cannot be derived as valuable or 
not valuable within the course of a proposition or argumentation. Donald 
Trump has shown us once more how this is done in his State of the Union 
Speech on 5 February 20208 as well as in his strategic announcements during 
the Coronavirus crisis.  
A precarious, if not terrifying, scenario for public discourses and the 
chance for actors to be heard by whatever statement they make, to create new 
blaming logics or to produce new enemies, which all fit their politico-
ideological purposes. Wodak (2019) describes it, for instance, as the conver-
sion of the victim–offender roles (by, for instance, Matteo Salvinis LEGA, US 
President Donald Trump, the Brexit Party of Nigel Farage, or Viktor Orban’s 
Fidesz). By this conversion, migrants are the powerful invaders, with the 
native population acting as the suppressed and exploited victims. The exam-
ples are manifold, but common discursive strategies are metaphors of natural 
disasters or the animalization of newly arriving people by comparing them to 
parasites or infiltrating the healthy natives with viruses and the like (the 
COVID-19 virus could potentially spiral this argument into new political 
significance). The framing is a war and struggle of us against them, and, 
therefore, narratives can be stylized by political actors who produce, follow, 
and mobilize such language in a way depicting themselves as the new politi-





7  The term of alternative facts found its way into politics and political process in the late 
1990s. 
8  Full Transcript: Trump’s 2020 State of the Union Address, The New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/state-of-union-transcript.html. Accessed: 
16.8.2020. 
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Impact on Public Discourses 
The impact of such developments is destructive at various levels, but it cer-
tainly leads to a disconnection between discourses on migration and migra-
tion realities (see also Ruhs et al. 2019). The response to foster ›evidence-
based‹ arguments and policy-making, a rationalization and depoliticization 
of the migration discourse and the introduction of ›fact-checkers‹ such as 
platforms like snopes.com (see, e.g., Graves and Cherubini 2016), has had 
little effect or even the opposite effect for the reasons described above.9 Ex-
perts or scientific knowledge has been openly criticized for representing 
societal elites and not the interests of ›the people‹ (see also Boswell 2018). 
Members of populist movements try intentionally not to associate themselves 
with expertise but with ›honest opinions‹ and claim-making by which the 
connection to the interests of ›the people‹ is established – a very different 
point of reference than the elite institutions as Mudde (2004) has shown. 
Simple and not overtly complex lines of argument are preferred and publicly 
mobilized instead. These lines of argumentation exclude complex and tech-
nical explanations in favor of simple claims and spontaneous action. Indeed, 
for populist movements, the rejection of expertise is a core part of their politi-
cal identity and strategy of political mobilization. Conversely, another key 
aspect is the identification with the claim that their movement is against the 
established facts or expertise and counter to the proposals followed by 
›mainstream‹ political actors. Established facts or knowledge become as such 
an enemy of the people and therefore of the populist movements. The identi-
fier ›against‹ plays an important role as simplicity and urgency are the quali-
ties that replace the values of truth, deliberation and reflection. Research and 
deliberation are virtues of the ›elites‹. Clarke and Newman (2017, p. 12) refer 
to a different ›sense of time‹ that can be found in populist movements. Direct 
action and the sudden implementation of promises are proclaimed and no 
empty words or irritating complexities and analysis – as done to some extent 
by mainstream politics – are therefore celebrated. 
How do such developments affect the public or the political discourse? It 
can respond in many ways as we can observe in Europe. A German specialty 
is the retreat into less conflict-ridden terrain. Although innovative and 
ground-breaking discussions on migration may have been achieved – as we 
can observe in many fields of migration in Germany and which have con-
structively contributed to various discursive developments –, yet a shifting 
took place, and this is the refocusing on the less conflict-ridden, but well-
trodden terrain, of ›migrant integration‹. Dealing with integration and its 
–––––––––––– 
9  This shall not presume that there are per se ›true‹ and ›false‹ descriptions of ›realities‹. 
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underlying ideology is much clearer and goal-oriented and has a long and 
rich history in Germany (see, e.g., Oltmer 2006) than the much wider, com-
plex and convoluted discourse of migration with all its facets. Oddly, but 
with symbolic power, the Christian Democrats proclaimed Germany as a 
»country of integration«10 in 2007 with the obvious intention of circumvent-
ing and dismissing the term ›country of immigration‹. This focus of making 
people similar and less different is represented most adequately in the fetish 
of the capacity of speaking the German language as proficiently as possible,11 
disregarding the migratory experience of people that have possibly grown up 
in a country in which more than five languages are frequently spoken and 
where an understanding of a working-level of language use is more com-
monplace (e.g., Eritrea). The background was and still is today the under-
standing of integration as a measure of the contributions of immigrants’ eco-
nomic and social performances to Germany and the German society. This is 
also why the term of ›promoting and demanding‹ (Fördern und Fordern) signi-
fies this understanding, which is driven by economic performance and the 
utilitarian value of immigration and the presence of people from potentially 
other places and spaces (see, for instance, Gomolla 2013).  
Yet a new strand of actors and academics in the field aim to revisit the 
term integration or replace it, and such drastic revisions are highly needed as 
one can observe a certain dominance of the integration topic in Germany for 
decades. This dominance has consecutively undermined the relevance and 
importance of the topic of migration as contributing to the country’s process 
and knowledge repertoire.  
An indicator of a neglected discussion on migration and the experience 
of the phenomenon but focusing on the more familiar topic of integration is 
the evolution of the public discourse during the arrival of people between 
2014 and 2018 during the humanitarian but so-called migration crisis. 
For instance,12 Vollmer and Karakayali (2018) found a volatile discourse 
that was first unexpectedly refugee-welcoming and empathetic, thereafter 
tumbling in the course of time and lastly disintegrating to a large extent. The 
understanding of migration realties were framed and politicized as per-
formed by people deserving help facilitated by mediatized representations 
of, for instance, women and children on the move, so that the public dis-
course was dominated by empathetic attitudes and narratives. An intricate 
and interdependent philanthropic relationship between the host country’s 
–––––––––––– 
10  Maria Böhmer (CDU), Deutscher Bundestag, 146. Sitzung, 22.2.2008, Plenarprotokoll, 
p. 15439. 
11  See, e.g., Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. 2007. Der Nationale Integra-
tionsplan: Neue Wege – Neue Chancen, Berlin. 
12  There certainly is a growing body of literature. 
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population and the refugees emerged. However, a downturn took place as 
soon as the association of migration processes and deservingness vanished 
due to new narratives (terrorism and events of undeservingness) painting a 
far different picture and building a framing of migration and migratory sub-
jects. A re-demonizing process of refugees and their labeling as undeserving 
migrants, or ›economic migrant‹ emerged.13 Without the reflexive knowledge 
in the public domain and more qualified understanding of the nature of mi-
gration, its processes and the drivers of migration, windows of ideological 
opportunity have and will open recurrently for conservative and right-wing 
parties, not only in Germany, but across the European Union and beyond.  
A second indicator is the oversimplification often used by political actors 
– due to a missing and neglected discussion – of the migration phenomenon 
to the push-pull logic of migratory processes. Surely, and still relevantly, 
there is a marvelous explanatory power of push-pull logics examining signif-
icant factors that influence population movements, but nowadays it seems 
shortsighted. Having emerged as one of the migration theories more than 
half a century ago that intended to describe and order migration logics (see 
Lee 1966), it is still a useful start to explain some migratory dynamics and 
procedures. However, it heavily oversimplifies the truly complex ramifica-
tions of migration processes and the ever-changing phenomenon or event of 
migration and its context and drivers. Black et al. (2011) refer to a plethora of 
drivers, including environmental ones, whereas Van Hear, Bakewell, and 
Long (2017) mention further drivers that come into play that cannot be fed 
into a model that has two sides and opposing mechanisms.14  
Expressed very crudely, migration studies and theory deal with people 
and not organic machines underlying a binary model. Decision-making pro-
cesses, even when it comes to migration, are not that simple to research, and 
Haas (2008) rightly criticized the blunt assumptions in the way individuals 
respond to incentives including full information situations and markets in 
various economic equilibriums. These are assumptions that are far from mi-
gration realties, which are instead very chaotic, spontaneous, irrational and 
very human. These qualities are underlined by the fact that potential mi-
grants may respond very differently or conversely to the various factors of 
–––––––––––– 
13  This has however further implications for the relabeling process widening the category 
›economic migrants‹, that is, potentially including a large number of people that are forced 
to leave their countries as a result of socioeconomic conditions and the threat of poverty or 
malnutrition. It would effectively demonize and illegitimatize an even broader category of 
forced migrants. 
14  If such opposing mechanisms are used, they tend to be used by researchers in migration 
literature as a starting point to underline the simplicity of it and to heighten the theoretical 
innovation presented by the researchers themselves, as Carling and Collins (2017) argued. 
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›push‹ and ›pull‹ forces (see also, e.g., Castles et al. 2014). Interactive markets 
and interdependent socioeconomic as well as political processes in the coex-
istence of migratory subjectivities just cannot be bound to a binary model 
with incentives, determinants and drivers. An inter- and transdisciplinary 
view of such interdependencies as well as cobwebbed networks of social 
relations and interactive factors may try to put forward some assumptions 
and regularities, but these need to be renewed and set into context for the 
given time and place. The nature of migration is too dynamic and the politi-
cal changes are happening too swiftly to set up models. Evidence and data 
improve knowledge of the process of migration, but academic disciplines 
shall be careful with producing models, predictions about journeys, quantifi-
cations or dichotomized categorizations (voluntary/involuntary or regu-
lar/irregular, or the new bordering practices of migrants and refugees). It 
undermines migratory subjectivity and agency, which have been proved in 
the past five years as very powerful. Knowledge of migration and its realties 
is unfortunately undermined by a discourse that has refocused on the much 
more comfortable issue of ›migrant integration‹ – especially in Germany.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this article carves out a mixture of developments underlining 
the need for more research as well as changes in the production of 
knowledge in public domains.  
Emotionality in policy-making and the neglect of evidence-based argu-
ments and deliberative decision-making in highly politicized contexts can be 
seen more generally as problematic, but it becomes a heightened issue in the 
policy domain of migration and its underlying public discourses. As argued 
in the paper, whereas emotionality and normative frameworks have resonat-
ed in past and present public discourses, this matter has entered a different 
dimension in the age of populism and post-factualism reshuffling the param-
eters of this problem to a large extent. 
The devaluation of what can be critically denoted as true, the irrelevance 
and mortification of scientific knowledge, critical and reflexive contempla-
tion, all point to a daunting scenario for public discourses and the chance for 
actors to be heard by whatever statement they make or to create new blaming 
logics or produce new enemies that suit their politico-ideological purposes or 
even agendas. The digitalized public discourse in which anyone has the 
chance to claim the truth, be published and receive recognition or even legit-
imacy in its content is not the problem as such. The problem is not the new 
freedom of being heard and having a voice by all users of the digitalized 
public domain, but the content that it contains, the text, the words and their 
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meaning. Provocation, verbal attacks, bullying and recognition for being 
outright harsh and hateful to other members of the public, is commonplace. 
Behavior and the content – may it be anti-Semitic, racist, sexist or nativistic – 
has become brutal. The additional procedural demonization of evidence-
based facts and knowledge and the stigmatization of ›elite actors‹ by the 
alleged ›real people‹ draws the nature and culture of public discourses into a 
Hobbesian age of ›all against all‹, of brutishness and a scenario of a destruc-
tive, instead of constructive, discursive conflict.  
Yet to retreat and hide behind the more comfortable and well-trodden 
path of integration ignores the innovative steps that have been made in Ger-
many in the past years concerning migration and the discourses on it. The 
same applies to a focus on oversimplified mechanistic models of migration to 
create artificial order and clarity. The push-pull model might be comfortable 
and plausible (especially for political actors), but it describes only a small 
part of the phenomenon and process of migration, by essentially oversimpli-
fying the complex and dynamic matter of migration and bluntly ignoring the 
subjectivity of the migratory agency.  
Certainly, these are arguments no politician or political actor would like 
to hear, but academia is not serving politics to make things simple. Therefore, 
academia might consider its distance and proceed to set out the research and 
methodologies needed for the sake of producing reflexive knowledge (see 
also Dahinden et al. 2020) and an understanding of migration and informing 
participatory processes. Knowledge of migration – not political popularity– is 
the firmest basis for policies serving humanity. It builds frameworks for con-
textualized and varying complex migratory situations in sending and receiv-
ing countries. In other words, this is a call for more empirical research in the 
field migration studies developing, for instance, complex meta-models of 
migration regimes and its implications (see also Andrijasevic et al. 2005; Pott 
et al. 2018) or the understanding of migration realties where the view and 
voice of migrancy move on the center stage of concern as well as of theoriza-
tion. Significantly, innovative and progressive inter- and transdisciplinary 
groups of migration and media/narration studies in collaboration with sub-
fields of psychology might shed light on the interconnections between migra-
tory process, media effects and cognitive perception processes in public dis-
courses. There is an urgent need to study and understand how and why data, 
facts and research may or may not affect public discourses on migration or 
the given policy-making landscapes in Germany, in Europe or in other con-
texts across the globe.  
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